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Abstract 
Recent studies in Australia and the United Kingdom indicate that a broad cross-section of organisations are 
failing to adequately protect or erase confidential data stored on hard disk drives before subsequent 
disposal. Over 90% of hard disks that were examined as a result of the two Independent studies were in an 
easily recoverable state with some drives simply requiring a boot. This paper will give an overview and 
comparison of the two studies conducted. Then an examination of possible factors responsible for the 
inadequate erasure of hard disk devices will be undertaken. Furthermore, possible future research 
directions will also be explored 
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INTRODUCTION 
Hard drives are the primary storage devices for most modern Internet enabled organisations.  Whether these 
drives are in large server based Raid arrays, a desktop PC or a laptop they all, potentially, contain 
information which, if it is discovered or disclosed, could have catastrophic consequences for the 
organisation or an individual.  Recent studies in Australia (Valli, 2004) and the United Kingdom (Jones 
et.al, 2005) indicate that a broad cross-section of organisations are failing to adequately protect or erase 
confidential data stored on hard disk drives before subsequent disposal.  Over 90% of hard disks that were 
examined as a result of the two Independent studies contained data that was in an easily recoverable state 
with some drives simply requiring a boot. Earlier studies conducted by (Garfinkel & Shelat, 2003) in the US 
found similar issue with erasure of hard disks. 
The US Department of Defense (USDoD) erasure standards (Defense, 1997) have become a de-facto 
standard and supporting commercial and freeware software exists for the secure erasure of such devices 
based upon these. The USDoD standard DoD 5220.22-M  is stated as “Overwrite all addressable locations 
with a character, its complement, then a random character and verify” p58, (Defense, 1997). It should be 
noted that this level of erasure is recommended for all devices except those containing Top Secret 
classification materials, which must be disposed of by disintegration into particles. The use of USDoD 
standards and other similar stringent erasure techniques are designed to make it sufficiently expensive or 
highly improbable that recovery can be achieved by using standard forensic recovery techniques. 
Furthermore, the use of high number of forensic rewrites (normally 35 as per the USDOD standard) is 
meant to provide protection against recovery of data via magnetic remanence techniques using electron 
microscopes to scan the disk surface. 
There are some perceived technical constraints for the timely secure erasure of software and data contained 
on these hard drives when systems have to be rapidly replaced as is common practice during system 
rollovers.  This paper will give an overview and comparison of the two studies conducted.  Then an 
examination of possible factors responsible for the inadequate erasure of hard disk devices will be 
undertaken.  Furthermore, possible future research directions will also be explored. 
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OVERVIEW OF THE STUDIES 
Two studies were conducted into the ability to forensically recover data contained on disposed or second-
hand hard disk mechanisms available for sale to the public.  The Australian study experimented on 23 
independent cases that were acquired through public computer auctions.  The UK case study experimented 
on 105 independent hard disks that were acquired from computer auctions, computer fairs and the on-line 
auction at e-Bay.  In the UK the disks were blind sourced to the University by a computer recycling 
company. In each study a battery of forensic techniques were applied to the hard disks to affect recovery.  In 
the Australian study 21 of the hard disks were easily recoverable, one hard disk was erased and one hard 
disk had mechanical failure.  In the UK study 105 disks were examined.  Of these 13 were unreadable due 
to mechanical failure, with 10 of these having been physically tampered, 16 had been erased and 76 were 
easily readable. 
The level of forensic expertise needed to recover the data contained on the disposed hard drives was very 
low.  In several cases simply powering on the hard drive revealed its contents virgo intactica from point of 
disposal to the examiners.  In both the Australian and the UK studies, simple use of the unformat command 
or the use of a hexadecimal editor allowed recovery of nearly all data.   
The profile of organisational types uncovered in both studies was broad from small home owned computer 
systems to government critical infrastructure provider server hard drives.  In Australia the only hard drive 
that was properly erased was a large telecommunications infrastructure provider hard disk from a desktop 
PC.  In the UK, of the 16 hard disks that had been properly erased, it was subsequently revealed that 12 had 
come from a computer recycling company that undertakes government contracts.  The origin of the 
remaining four erased disks could not be determined. All of the hard drives that were recoverable contained 
information that was confidential or commercial in nature whose disclosure could have had catastrophic 
consequences for the individual or the organisation concerned. None of the drives examined were using 
cryptography to protect the sensitive confidential or commercial data contained on the disks. 
In some of the cases the hard disk drives had files that carried date stamps that were less than two weeks old 
at the time that they were acquired, implying that the information contained on the hard disks was current.  
It should be noted that this two-week turnaround is often well within organisational security policy 
constraints relating to password changing on systems for instance. This narrow window of time from 
disposal to resale makes the data highly contextual and relevant to intelligence gathering for attack or other 
malicious intentions. 
While it might be expected that the disks that had come from home use computers and from small 
companies would be more likely to contain information that should have been erased, the reality was that 
there was no significant difference between these and the larger enterprises discovered in the studies.   
The level of organizational information that was recovered from the disks included a wide range of 
information that would be of value and interest to a number of groups, including;  
The disks (16) from one major leisure service organisation, had originally been used by the finance 
department, including those used by the finance manager and their assistant (the root directories of the disks 
were named FMANAGER/STOCK and FASSISTANT/FMANAGER) that contained detailed documents 
on their property holdings, names, addresses and telephone numbers of members of staff, wage information, 
balance sheets, incident reports, profit and loss balance sheets, expenses details for members of staff – all of 
which was less than three months old.  Another example from a large financial institution gave details of 
confidential memos marked ‘for internal use only’, staff directories and staff profiles. Disks from a third 
organisation (a food biotechnology company) gave details of crop trials in the UK, including locations dates 
of the trials. 
The disks that were recovered from academic institutes, which were found to contain a large amount of 
information, including course work and exam results – actual and predicted, letters of reference, together 
with template letters and logos. 
The information on one disk that was recovered that was found to have been used by a primary (elementary) 
school was particularly disturbing in that it contained a significant level of information relating to children 
that could be identified, including reports on student progress throughout the year, a report that related to a 
bullying incident and another that related to medical treatment for another child. 
Examples of disks recovered from private systems included a database of passwords from the system of one 
(identifiable) user and emails relating to an extra-marital affair, where the participants could be identified. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE  
The implications of information being available to people who have no right to access it are wide ranging.  
From the point of view of the corporation, there is the potential exposure for industrial espionage, non-
compliance with statutory or industry sector requirements and potential litigation. In the case of the disks 
that could be attributed to the commercial sector, the potential cost to the organisation of a leakage of 
information is high.  For the leisure service industry organisation (a household name in the UK), the 
information could be attributed to its finance department and the loss of it could be considered to be nothing 
short of negligent.  To any competitor or a potential supplier, the level and detail that was available would 
allow for a very accurate analysis of the financial viability of a number of the operations being run by the 
organisation.  It provided details of turnover, stock levels and the names and contact details for staff.   
The disks that had previously belonged to a financial institution gave information including directories of 
staff and business plans, all of which would be of high potential value to anyone outside the organisation 
and of great potential embarrassment to the organisation.  Some of the issues that failure to dispose of the 
data effectively exposed the organisations to include: breach of statutory or industry sector regulations, 
fraud, industrial espionage and potential network intrusion or hacking.  Where credit card or at other 
account details have been left on the devices simple and significant theft can occur.  Furthering this premise, 
what would occur if a high-value, high transaction customers’ details were compromised? The potential for 
financial malfeasance is large, immediate and potentially catastrophic. 
The discovery of information in the studies from major information and critical infrastructure providers has 
significant implications for national security. Since the initial research over a year ago and more recently 
again in Australia (Jenkins, 2005) government servers acquired at an auction were found to contain sensitive 
information. This risk is further substantiated in research by (Valli, 2004) where computers acquired at 
auction had information from state owned infrastructure utilities present. The potential for misuse of this 
information by people wishing to impact on the nation state such as other governments, activist and terrorist 
groups is something that cannot be discounted as an unrealisable threat. If we run a scenario where servers 
came out of a major infrastructure provider and these servers contained SCADA control software and codes, 
the potential impact of this could be catastrophic. 
For an individual or small business, some of the issues that the failure to erase the information can cause are 
identity theft, blackmail and fraud. Identity theft is one of the fastest growing new trends in criminal activity 
and much of the activity is now focused on the Internet with the growth of spyware. One has to ask the 
question: why should thieves spend time developing spyware programs when much of the information they 
require is readily available at auction or computer recyclers?  
Furthermore, the high level of discovery that was encountered in both of these studies demonstrates that 
many organisational security initiatives have been negated because of the poor asset disposal procedures. It 
is almost incongruous that large organisations could spend millions if not tens of millions in currency per 
year defending the corporate edifices from external and internal compromise and leave the very data that 
people are trying to acquire on disposed hard drives or equipment. This approach by organisations to 
erasure negates the money spent on deploying and maintaining countermeasures such as firewalls, virus 
scanners, spyware removers and content filters which are used to reduce the risk of systems penetration or 
compromise. 
WHY NOT ERASED? 
The length of time it takes to erase a hard disk is an issue, particularly if the hard disk is in a machine that is 
to be rolled out over a weekend period for a large organisation. The redundant computer is often live until 
the close of business at weeks end, leaving little time for the secure erasure let alone removal and de-
registration of the equipment. It would be impractical in terms of time and human resource to remove each 
drive and erase it. This problem will only increase as hard disk capacities continue to climb and secure 
erasure which involves the need multiple overwrites is needed to ensure confidentiality. In the case of the 
large organisations that were identified in the UK study, it was subsequently discovered that in all cases, the 
organisations had agreements with third party organisations to securely dispose of the material. It is clear 
that these arrangements had failed to achieve the objective and the organisations must be considered to 
remain responsible, as they had not tested that the arrangement worked. 
Recovery from drives that may actually still be functional on a computer that has failed is a possibility. This 
is could be categorised as a loss of data by misassumption i.e. the specialist has assumed that the hard disk 
is the cause of the failure. Or in the case of the Australian study the hard drives were recovered from laptops 
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that were sent in for repair and then having been taken off of organisational asset registers were disposed of 
by third parties. 
A lack of legislative requirement could be a contributing factor in the lack of proper erasure of digital 
media. Many Australian State and Federal Acts cover the use, storage and transmission of information. One 
such act is the Privacy Act, 1988 which provides legislated requirement to protect information collected on 
individuals. It covers the transmission and transferral of data and private information but does not cover the 
destruction or disposal of this data particularly in digital form.  This is an area that could be considered for 
incorporation into legislature to ensure the correct erasure of data from drives. The efficacy of this approach 
is also questionable as the UK study found hard disks that under the Data Protection Act should have been 
erased. 
Hardware vendors are realizing the need for protecting data on hard disk drives and Seagate have released a 
hard disk in 2.5” form factor that has onboard hardware based encryption of data (Seagate, 2005). Other 
vendors such as (Systems, 2002) have had third party hardware encryption for hard disks for some time. 
These types of hardware based solutions provide the only real protection from compromise of sensitive data. 
They provide protection by encryption of the hard disk drive in hardware 
CONCLUSION 
Further studies need to be conducted into the reasons why organizations do not adequately ensure that their 
hard drives are erased properly. Freeware utilities exist that will adequately perform erasure of hard disk 
drives so cost of software acquisition is a relatively minor issue.  
Research should focus on the human and organisational impediments to the secure erasure of data devices. 
The inability to erase drives from a technology perspective, as a defence for non-erasure does not hold the 
drives can be erased. However, as entry level hard disks are now approaching 80 Gigabytes in size the issue 
of time is a significant factor and warrants investigation as this will only continue to grow as the use of 
larger digital storage technology expands.  
Sales of other storage technology such as USB flash memory sticks, Compact Flash, Secure Digital Card 
Memory are also rapidly increasing, as is their usage. These other alternate channel repositories of corporate 
memory will also require investigation. In particular flash memory may be recoverable particularly Flash 
Translation Layer (FTL) types of memory. As erasers may only erase the FTL leaving the data intact in the 
memory space on the device. 
Research into effective strategies to educate end users is urgently needed to combat the extreme risk of data 
recovery from incorrectly cleansed data storage devices that for the best part individuals and organisations 
appear to be either ignorant of or simply unwilling to address adequately. This will then provide 
mechanisms for the proper and correct protection of corporate data. 
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